【TIO 太和观察家】High-Quality Development & China's Strategic Autonomy

关注时代需要

On Times We Focus

☉ 太和智库线上英文刊物《太和观察家》2024年4月刊第43期原创文章，转载请注明出处。

☉ This article is from the April issue of TI Observer (TIO), an online publication of Taihe Institute. Please indicate the source if you hope to share this article.

☉ 点击“阅读原文”，查看本期精彩内容。（文件加载需要时间，请耐心等待）

☉ Click "Read More" to access the full text of TIO vol. 43. (It may take some time to download the PDF text.)

正文1992字，读完约需8分钟。

Wordcount: 1992. The article will take about 8 minutes to read.

---

黄裕舜

Brian Wong Yueshun

·香港大学哲学系助理教授与当代中国与世界研究中心研究员

·Assistant Professor in Philosophy, and Fellow at the Centre on Contemporary China and the World, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Introduction

"New quality productive forces" is an economic development concept relevant to the comprehensive strategic autonomy of China. By unpacking the definition and characters of new quality productive forces and strategic autonomy, this article attempts to analyze the link between new quality productive forces and China's role and goals on the world stage.

At China's 2024 Two Sessions meeting, the Government Work Report called upon China to modernize its industrial system and embrace "new quality productive forces." The term was first coined by the Chinese President during his trip to the "Rust Belt" of China – the Northeast of the country.

The rejuvenation of rural areas, especially in inland areas like Central and Northwestern provinces, and previously industrialized but now struggling ones in the Northeast, is a core tenet of his economic vision. Such rejuvenation serves as a crucial process in ensuring that prosperity is accessible to all Chinese citizens, as opposed to solely those who have the privilege of residing in or moving to more affluent areas, such as coastal provinces.

The words during his visit reflected a significant emphasis on a more balanced developmental approach across different regions and foreshadowed highly comprehensive macroeconomic reforms seeking to emancipate and leverage the hitherto-inhibited labor productivity in less developed regions of China. His recommendations also highlighted the significance of China's efforts to continuously enlarge its high-potential middle-class population, which would provide the world with a leading consumption market over the coming decade.

It would be erroneous for external observers to dismiss this proposed concept as merely a rebranded or rehashed version of the "Made in China 2025" initiative issued in May 2015. A more accurate interpretation of the "new quality productive forces" proposal is that China is keen on shifting away from being a purely catch-all manufacturing powerhouse to a globally competitive economic force with a comparative advantage in nascent, cutting-edge technologies and advanced manufacturing. Nurturing and harnessing new quality productive forces is hence the next stage in China's industrial transformation.

Making Sense of New Quality Productive Forces – An Interpretation

New quality productive forces consist of several core components. 

The first is an emphasis on total factor productivity (TFP) enhancement. Growth in TFP denotes output growth that cannot be attributed to growth in labor or capital: it reflects production efficiency, advancements in innovation and technical frontiers, and the results of organizational and management improvements. It amplifies the value of labor and capital, even if the latter remains constant. The Chinese President's report to the 20^th National Congress of the Communist Party of China explicitly referenced this economic concept in Section 4, "Accelerating the Creation of a New Development Pattern and Pursuing High-Quality Development."

Chinese leaders are acutely aware that as the largest contributor to economic growth in recent years, bolstering TFP is crucial to the economy and its future trajectory. Whilst certain scholars have recently alluded to a purported decline in TFP over the past decade, it is evident that there is much China can and will do to improve its economic productivity. This can be achieved through streamlining and targeting scientific research toward strategically vital technologies. 

The second component is the incorporation of "innovation and sustainability," key objectives of "China's new development philosophy," into the country's production apparatus and processes. As a world-leading power in sustainable transition and the promotion of nascent renewable energy technologies, China has undergone groundbreaking transformations in terms of environmental and industrial policies over the past decade to address the daunting challenge of climate change. 

The shift toward electric vehicles, wind and solar energy, or even nuclear energy, could not be accomplished without holistic and qualitative uplifting of the country's productive forces. It is not solely about the numbers, but the quality offered by the production capacity. 

With that said, so long as state-owned enterprises work in tandem with an empowered private sector that moves to regain momentum and confidence, China's path to sustainable innovation remains clear and promising. The "new quality" of the advocated productive forces will likely manifest through continuous strengthening of secondary and tertiary education infrastructure, increased investment in efficacious and cost-effective research, and heightened focus on and facilitation of start-up entrepreneurship and inventors working at the intersection of sustainability, technology, and social impact. 

The third component is the embedding of pragmatic pluralism into developmental trajectories. There is an oft-asserted mantra in some circles that China's developmental model must be fundamentally opposed to non-Chinese, specifically Western developmental models. Yet this is a misconception that unduly conflates difference with opposition. As the Chinese President noted recently, China does not believe in "adopting just a single model of development." He also affirmed that "developing new quality productive forces does not mean neglecting or abandoning traditional industries."

These insights crucially demonstrate that it is only through drawing upon the best of existing and past models, as well as channeling the collective wisdom of China's economic academia, government officials, and private sector, that China can develop a sustainable and viable path of industrial improvement and reform. Most of these so-called "old" sectors, whether it be property or digital platforms, will continue to play an important role in the years to come, not only given their significant contribution to employment, but also because of the need for a balanced economic portfolio overall.  

The Case for Comprehensive Strategic Autonomy

I now turn to the argument that the development of new quality productive forces is critical to China's ability to achieve comprehensive strategic autonomy on the world stage. Some clarifications of this concept, which I draw partial inspiration from European geo-strategy, are duly needed.

To be clear, autonomy on the world stage here does not denote hegemony or dominance. As Chinese leaders have explicitly stated, and as any sound political observer could reliably note, hegemony is both costly and risky to maintain for any individual country. As a pragmatic nation, China is unlikely to pursue the same model as the hegemonic powers of the past, such as the UK until the mid-20^th century, or the US thereafter, both of which governed extensive overseas territories, maintained overseas military presence, and became involved in conflicts. Instead, autonomy closely aligns with the Chinese people's ability and right to defend their interests on the international stage, live according to their cultural and social norms, maintain the defined social contract with their government, and contribute to a world where global challenges can only be addressed through multilateral cooperation.

The discretion afforded by such autonomy must be exercised strategically – that is, China should be able to secure the interests of its people without harming its neighbors or significant partners. A core tenet of Mencius' account of "Wang Dao," in contrast to the force-oriented "Ba Dao," as touted by Han Fei and Shang Yang, is that leaders should lead by genuinely winning over the hearts and minds of people. When applied to foreign policy and diplomacy, "Wang Dao" calls upon countries to pursue, strengthen, and project soft power, which enables others around the world to view them not as threats, but as pioneers and anchoring figures worthy of respect. Legitimacy stems not from violent force or military might, but from strategic and transformative value-based leadership. In my view, this is what differentiates "un-strategic" autonomy from "strategic" autonomy. 

The autonomy in question must be comprehensive in at least two ways – dimensionally and in relation to other countries and non-state actors, such as corporations and investors. The rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse and market over the past few decades has positioned the country as a key node in the global economy – one that can withstand the vacuous cries for "de-coupling" by sheer virtue of its technological maturity, industrious work ethic, and substantial manufacturing population base unique to the country.

Beyond the commercial aspects, the incumbent leadership has commenced active development and articulation of its own approach to technological, political, and industrial governance. Whilst the jury is still out on whether such efforts will eventually pay off, it is evident that the Chinese leadership has awakened to the reality of supply chain resilience, self-sufficiency in strategically sensitive sectors, combining digitalization with infrastructural developments to ensure that digital technologies are harnessed for good use. Such recognition is pivotal: the Chinese state cannot be "globally autonomous" unless it possesses autonomy in a rich multitude of dimensions – including the economic, financial, technological (especially in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, nanotechnology, and biotechnology), and political ones, to name but the core few.

There are also questions about partnerships that China may opt to establish. In an era of globalization, despite challenges like the attenuation of financial integration and inter-connectivity, or supply chain disruptions due to the pandemic and geopolitical conflicts, no country can survive alone. Yet China must ensure that its choice of collaboration does not unduly and inadvertently aid forces bent on containing and hindering its goals.

New Quality Productive Forces Have a Role to Play in China's Search for Comprehensive Strategic Autonomy 

With the above measures, we should be able to see how the two conceptually impressive frameworks come together.

First, new quality productive forces play a central role in writing the next chapter of this story. As many have noted, the days when China could lean into unbridled, investment-led growth in the property sector and exports to a few select markets like the United States and the European Union as core economic pillars are now over. The former is unsustainable due to excessive leveraging, which the incumbent administration has swiftly redressed through a series of difficult but necessary decisions. The latter has become increasingly difficult due to the ideological nature of geopolitics and the structural competition between China and the US.

To remain a truly autonomous actor free from economic coercion and potential sabotage by rivals and competitors, China must diversify beyond traditional industries, and seek to build up a resilient middle class with salubrious household incomes. Recently, Zhang Jun, the Dean of the School of Economics at Fudan University, has proposed a "Household Income Doubling Plan" designed to tackle the difficulties in the post-COVID era. His recommendations hold significant merit.

Second, China must pursue dynamic self-sufficiency through selectively opening its economy to existing and prospective partners, whilst minimizing undue risks accrued from exposure to external actors with insidious intentions. Autonomy requires both security from foreign interference and sustainability in economic vitality. This is why Chinese regulators continually reduce barriers to trade, investment, and joint ventures with receptive and constructive international businesses. It also demonstrates that non-politicized cooperation with home-grown Chinese champions can yield stable benefits.

Chinese enterprises should seek to bolster empathetic candor and transparency in communications and engagement efforts with foreign firms, whilst adhering to national security principles. In lieu of viewing foreign-domestic partnerships as a zero-sum game with restrictive knowledge transfers, Chinese firms can afford to identify areas for joint innovation where benefits are shared, while also carefully and explicitly delineating areas where national security considerations take precedence. This delicate balance involves preventing excessive reliance on external forces whilst maintaining China's appeal as an attractive destination for foreign investors.

Finally, the best China story is one that highlights the country's resilience as an economic powerhouse based upon both the physical and virtual economies, rather than merely relying on the latter. Whether it is productivity gains contributing to the raw growth figures or broader improvements to the average quality of life through expanded infrastructural coverage, structured and methodical urbanization, or the refinement and uplifting of human capital through high-quality higher education, the ideal China story is the story of holistic development. It is this story that critically anchors the country's soft power internationally and heightens the attractiveness of its government's distinctive outcome-oriented pragmatism to countries that are wary and disillusioned with the neoliberal logic oft-heralded as conventional wisdom in Western economics.

Fundamentally, as China continues to rise as a responsible global power, there is much that its leaders and people can do – together – in unleashing the productivity that remains untapped within the population. 

The above contents only represent the views of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Taihe Institute.

关于TIO

太和智库线上英文刊物《太和观察家》（TI Observer）致力于促进中外沟通交流，弥合“理解鸿沟”。

TI Observer (TIO) is an online monthly English publication produced by Taihe Institute. TIO is dedicated to promoting transnational interaction and mutual understanding, thus bridging the gap of misunderstanding and bringing China and the world closer to each other.

TIO本期封面

TIO本期目录

TIO本期作者

TIO执行委员会

相关内容

【TIO 太和观察家】Global South: New-Era Modernization

---

国以人兴，政以才治。

太和智库，关注时代。

长按二维码关注我们

公众号：taihezhiku

如有需要，敬请联系太和智库秘书处。

欢迎读者通过智库邮箱踊跃提交原创、首发稿件并留下联系方式，以便秘书处联系稿酬及加入智库相关事宜。

电 话：[phone]

邮 箱：[e-mail]

地 址：北京市朝阳区东三环南路顺迈金钻大厦23层

文章不错，点个“在看”吧！